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Predictive policing refers to a three-part process: (1) data of one or more type 
are ingested; (2) algorithmic methods use ingested data to forecast the occurrence 
of crime in some domain of interest; and (3) police use forecasts to inform strategic 
and tactical decisions in the field.  A primary goal of predictive policing is to 
reduce uncertainty so that police can approach the allocation of resources in an 
optimal manner.  The theory is that an optimal allocation of police resources has a 
better chance at disrupting opportunities for crime before they happen. 
Although simple in principle, there are many subtle questions that surround 
each part of the predictive policing process.  What types of data go into prediction?  
What are the biases associated with these data?  How do the algorithmic methods 
work?  Are algorithmic methods for crime forecasting better than existing 
practice?  How do police actually use predictions in the field?  Are outcomes from 
the use of predictions in the field unequal and/or unconstitutional?  Each of these 
questions, and many more that could be listed, deserves careful scrutiny with the 
understanding that the answers should have an impact on how (and if) predictive 
policing should be deployed in the future. 
This paper takes up one particular question surrounding the origin of biases in 
police data and how such biases may be expected to percolate through forecasting 
algorithms to impact police action.  I specifically look at place-based predictive 
policing, where algorithmic methods ingest data on the time, location, and type of 
past crimes and deliver forecasts for where and when crime is most likely to occur 
in narrow space-time windows.  The principal question is whether data biases, 
when filtered through algorithmic place-based policing, should be expected to lead 
predictions to produce under- or over-policing for a given community. 
There is voluminous evidence that policing practice is not immune from bias.  
Racial bias has been documented in the targeting of vehicles and pedestrians for 
stops, issuing traffic citations, drug enforcement and arrests, use of force, and even 
the decision about whether to fire a weapon in training simulators.1  How exactly 
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explicit and implicit biases operate to produce such outcomes is difficult to 
disentangle,2 but there is no doubt that such unequal outcomes exist. 
Given this empirical record, there is real and justified concern that algorithmic 
methods for predictive policing, rather than helping the situation, will only serve to 
exacerbate bias and amplify unequal outcomes.  That the exacerbation of bias is 
possible has been demonstrated in simulations that take up a hypothetical case of 
predictive policing using drug arrest data from Oakland, California.3  The core idea 
in that work is that if people of color are stopped and arrested disproportionately 
for drug crimes relative to actual prevalence, and if those arrests are the basis for 
forecasts, then predictions will lead to more disproportionate stops and arrests.  
Unequal outcomes will grow and, not surprisingly, subsequent arrests would be 
consistently confirmed by predictions.  The present paper takes a step back from 
this very specific example to ask more fundamental and general questions about 
how implicit bias impacts crime event data. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  First, I examine the origin 
of data biases from a logical standpoint.  I take as a starting point the assumptions 
that explicit and implicit biases do exist and that these biases act against the 
interests of individuals whom the police contact if those individuals represent a 
particular social group.  Second, I discuss in general terms the expected impact of 
these data biases on risk assessments.  Third, I provide a theoretical exploration of 
the impact of data biases on place-based predictive policing of the type tested in 
Los Angeles.4  The analysis relies on simulation methods rather than analysis of 
real-world data.  I conclude with a discussion of limitations and future possible 
avenues of research. 
 
II. THE LOGIC OF BIAS IN POLICE CRIME EVENT DATA 
 
Police data is biased in ways both mundane and extraordinary.  The nature of 
such biases likely parallels the complexity of the data; more complex data, such as 
text narratives of events, is likely to embed bias in subtle and difficult to detect 
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ways.  Here, I focus on primitive data elements associated with crime events 
recorded by the police.  Such events are minimally described by the time and 
location of occurrence as well as the type of crime.  For example, a report might 
identify an armed robbery at 1251 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, at 6:47 PM 
on Friday, September 1, 2017.  The data primitives associated with crime events 
are recorded in generally fixed form at the time police officers verify the event.  
For example, the original call for service might list the address of the robbery as 
1249 South Grand, but upon arrival to investigate, the officers find out that the 
robbery occurred at 1251 South Grand.  Certainly, changes might be made to data 
primitives at some much later point by individuals distant from the crime itself 
(e.g., IT staff or clerks), wherein explicit and implicit bias might play a role.  My 
main concern, however, is the operation of bias in the process of police initially 
recording the record. 
There are several baseline sources of bias that can accompany all police 
recording of crime.  On the one hand, crime is substantially underreported across 
all crime types.5  Officially reported crime data is therefore subject to a sampling 
bias from the start.  This bias has many dimensions.  There are many reasons why 
crime is underreported, only some of which have to do with the police.6  The 
correlation between reporting rates and race-ethnicity actually runs counter to the 
common narrative with whites underreporting crime at higher rates than both 
Latino/Hispanic and black populations.7  On average, underreporting has remained 
relatively stable over time,8 while trust in the police presumably has not.  A related 
source of bias is police intentionally undercounting crime either through 
intentional mislabeling or failing to report.  This bias stems from perverse 
incentives for police to make the world seem better than it actually is.  These two 
sources of bias will warrant comment later on, but they are not the focus of the 
present analysis. 
I now turn to sources of bias that lurk in the basic social interactions that 
produce crime reporting.  These interactions are expected to vary depending upon 
the type of crime and how it is that police come to know about that crime in the 
first place.  Consider a generic residential burglary.  There are four pathways 
through which the police may become aware of such an event: (1) the public calls 
to report the burglary; (2) environmental cues (e.g., a broken window or forced 
door) signal directly to the police that a burglary has occurred; (3) the police 
observe a burglary in action; or (4) some predicate event produces evidence linking 
back to a burglary (e.g., a traffic or pedestrian stop). 
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Analogous pathways are at play for other crime types.  In the case of an 
aggravated assault, the police might become aware of the event because (1) the 
public, including the victim or a third party, calls to report an assault; (2) some 
environmental cue (e.g., a direct observation of a victim after the fact or discovery 
of an abandoned weapon) points to the occurrence of an assault; (3) the police 
observe the assault as it is happening; or (4) some predicate event produces 
evidence that the assault occurred (e.g., weapon recovered during a pedestrian stop 
is linked to an unsolved crime).  In the case of a narcotics offense, (1) a third party 
calls the police about drug use or narcotics trafficking activity; (2) some 
environmental cue (e.g., discarded needles) points to drug use or trafficking; (3) 
the police observe drug use or narcotics trafficking in action; or (4) some predicate 
event produces evidence of narcotics use or trafficking. 
Implicit bias may operate in each of these pathways in quite different ways.  
Assume first that the bias operates against the interests of an individual in direct 
contact with the police if he is a member of a targeted social group.  For example, 
if the implicit bias involves racial stereotypes, then police interactions with a 
young man of color would tend to produce outcomes that are against his interests.  
If that young man is the victim of a crime, the implicit bias works to minimize the 
significance of victimization.9  If the young man is the suspect in a crime, the 
implicit bias works to maximize his liability.  If we consider how the implicit bias 
operates for individuals of a non-targeted group, then the significance of 
victimization is maximized for the victim, and the liability is minimized for the 
suspect.  In the following discussion, I will follow this logic only as it applies to 
the targeted group.  The key observation rests on how pathways to knowledge of a 
crime differentially bring police in contact with victims or suspects. 
Consider how implicit bias operates depending upon how police first become 
aware of a burglary.  In the case of the burglary being reported to the police 
directly by a member of the public, the person in contact with the police is most 
likely the victim.  Reemphasizing that we are only talking about a victim from the 
targeted social group, implicit bias will seek to minimize the significance of the 
burglary.  Minimizing victimization might occur through the responding officer 
downgrading the crime type from a burglary to some lesser crime that is more 
likely to slip under the radar.  For example, downgrading a burglary to a vandalism 
or trespassing would move the crime from a Part I crime, counted by the FBI, to a 
Part II crime, not counted by the FBI.10  The responding officer might also 
discourage the victim from filing a report at all.  Recognize that downgrading or 
deletion of crimes might occur sometime after the contact between the responding 
officer and the victim. 
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Now consider the case where a police officer has observed some cue in the 
environment signaling that a burglary has occurred.  Perhaps the officer drives by a 
house and sees a door pried open, a slashed screen, or a broken window.  
Observing this cue may lead the officer to make contact with the resident of the 
house who then verifies that a burglary has indeed occurred.  The interaction that 
results is again between the police officer and a victim.  The operation of implicit 
bias in this case is expected to be identical to the above scenario for a burglary 
reported directly by the victim.  There is an added possibility, however, that the 
officer might make a biased judgement about the homeowner on the basis of other 
indirect information.  For example, the officer may see burglary cues and 
recognize what they signal but choose not to act on that knowledge because the 
officer knows or thinks he knows about the demographic makeup of the 
environment he is patrolling.  The crime is not investigated and therefore not 
reported as a result of the implicit bias operating against a victim with assumed 
characteristics.  The minimization of victimization is the same either way. 
Now consider a very different situation wherein a burglar is detected during 
the commission of the crime.  There is no doubt that a crime has occurred, nor is 
there uncertainty about the specific nature of the crime having been directly 
observed.  Implicit bias may operate at multiple levels in this situation.  The police 
officer may be more likely to intervene because of the race of the offender.  The 
police officer may be more inclined to detain and charge for the crime.  The type 
or degree of the crime might be upgraded relative to the crime as observed.  One 
can imagine a trespassing upgraded to a burglary or a burglary upgraded to a home 
invasion.  Overall, because the target of police attention is the offender, the 
proposition is that the bias will operate to maximize liability. 
Finally, consider the case where there is a predicate event, such as a traffic 
stop, that leads to the stop and search of an individual.  During the search, burglary 
tools or stolen property are recovered—evidence which is eventually linked back 
to a specific crime.  Implicit bias might play a role in two distinct ways in this 
situation.  It might be involved in the predicate event and therefore taint the 
discovery of the evidence of a burglary.  Bias might also play an additional role in 
the characterization of the burglary itself.  As in the case of catching the burglar in 
the act, bias may influence whether the crime is upgraded in its degree. 
Implicit bias may operate in similar ways for aggravated assaults or narcotics 
crimes.  Some pathways bring police into contact with victims, while others bring 
police into contact with suspects.  In the former case, implicit bias will seek to 
minimize victimization through the downgrading of crimes.  In the latter, implicit 
bias will seek to maximize liability through upgrading of crimes. 
The two baseline sources of bias have expected impacts that parallel implicit 
bias acting against the interest of victims.  Regardless of what specific motive a 
civilian individual has for not reporting a crime, the consequence is a minimization 
of victimization.  Similarly, the perverse incentives police have to downgrade or 
underreport crime also serve to minimize apparent victimization.  The downstream 
consequences are the same in both cases: the estimation of risk is minimized.  
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However, it is worthwhile to note that bias in both cases operates separately from 
any implicit bias effects that arise through police interacting with victims and 
suspects in response to specific crimes.  Basic underreporting bias originates with 
the victim, while the perverse reporting incentives should apply regardless of what 
community is being served. 
 
III. IMPACT OF BIAS ON RISK ESTIMATION AND LEVELS OF POLICING 
 
The impact of these sources of data bias on the estimation of risk is relatively 
easy to intuit.  When a crime is downgraded, or not reported at all, the risk that can 
be assigned to the place and time of that crime must itself be downgraded.  
Conversely, when a crime is upgraded, the risk that can be assigned to the place 
and time of that crime must itself be upgraded. 
If we assume then that police use estimated risk as a basis for future resource 
allocation, then downgrading risk may lead to under-policing.  Police will be 
directed or choose to go to other places with higher risk.  By contrast, the 
consequence of upgrading a risk assessment may be over-policing.  Police will be 
directed or choose to go to these places over others with lower assessed risk.  
Stated simply: If implicit bias acts against victims, then the intuitive outcome is 
less policing, not more; if implicit bias acts against suspects, then the intuitive 
outcome is more policing, not less.  These twin observations fit some narratives of 
how bias in policing impacts minority communities but not all.11 
 
IV. PLACE-BASED PREDICTIVE POLICING 
 
Though intuitive, how data biases percolate through algorithmic processes 
underlying predictive policing needs to be addressed.  The focus here is on place-
based predictive policing algorithms and specifically the Epidemic-Type 
Aftershock Sequence (ETAS) model.12  The model describes the risk of crime at 






The parameter ߣ is the instantaneous rate of crime in a given location; μ is the 
stationary background rate of crime characteristic of that location; θ describes the 
number of repeat victimization events expected to follow any one triggering crime, 
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called the self-excitation productivity; and ߱ is the time scale over which repeat 
victimization effects operate.  The parameter ti is the time of each and every crime 
event i prior to time t.  In the absence of any repeat victimization effects, Equation 
(1) simplifies to ߣ(t) = μ and describes a stationary Poisson process.  Where repeat 
victimization plays a role, Equation (1) describes a self-exciting point process.13  
The model presented in Equation (1) is a temporal point process.  Fully spatio-
temporal models may also be used, which allows for self-excitation to occur not 
only in time but also across space.14 
The parameters of Equation (1) are estimated using either Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) or its close cousin Expectation Maximization 
(EM).15  Both procedures work by first guessing a set of parameter values and then 
estimating the probability that those are the correct values given empirical data on 
hand.  In the case of predictive policing, model estimation uses the times ti of all 
reported crimes of a given type.  This process is repeated until the probabilistic 
estimates no longer change.  It can be shown that both MLE and EM quickly 
converge to correct parameter estimates within some error dependent upon the 
volume of data (see below). 
The jump to real-world application is made by comparing the instantaneous 
risk ߣ estimated for a given crime type at each site in a jurisdiction and then 
choosing the top N sites where the risk is highest.  The sites themselves are 
typically small (e.g., 500’ x 500’ regions).  These sites are then presented as 
locations for police engagement, in whatever form that may take, until such time as 
the model is reestimated, and new risk assessments are made.  Model reestimation 
is typically done on a shift-by-shift basis as new data comes in.16  There is no 
magic number for how many sites to choose.  Rather, the number of sites should be 
calibrated to the amount of available police resources.  For example, if a policing 
division regularly operates three patrol vehicles, then that area might regularly 
support between three and six prediction sites. 
 
V. THE IMPACT OF DATA BIAS ON MODEL FITTING 
 
Data bias enters into the ETAS model through the event times ti (and spatial 
locations xi, yi, if a full spatio-temporal model is used).  Following from above, I 
am concerned with how biased downgrading or upgrading of crimes impacts the 
fit of the ETAS model.  I use simulation to provide guidance on this issue (see 
Figs. 1 and 2).  The simulation procedure is straightforward.  The first step 
involves simulating a self-exciting temporal point process with known parameter 
values for μ, θ, and ߱.  The result is a sequence of simulated event times ti.  The 
                                                                                                                                      
13  See Mohler, supra note 4; see also Mohler, supra note 12. 
14  See Mohler, supra note 4; see also Mohler, supra note 12. 
15  Erik Lewis & George Mohler, A Nonparametric EM Algorithm for Multiscale Hawkes 
Processes, 2011 J. NONPARAMETRIC STAT. 1. 
16  See Mohler, supra note 12. 
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second step is to estimate the parameters using MLE and the simulated data.  Since 
we know what the true parameters are for a simulated sequence, we can assess the 
accuracy and precision of the MLE estimates.  With this knowledge in hand, we 
can move to the third step, which is to perform experiments that capture the impact 
of different types and degrees of data bias.  One set of experiments concerns biased 
downgrading of crimes.  Given a model that is estimated for Ntrue number of crimes 
of one type (e.g., burglary), downgrading any of those crimes (e.g., from burglary 
to vandalism) causes them to drop out of the estimation process.  This leaves Nbiased 
< Ntrue number of crimes.  Estimating the model using the Nbiased crimes provides 
insight into the impact of the downgrading bias on the characterization of risk and, 
ultimately, how it might drive changes in policing.  I examine repeated 
downgrading of 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% of the events contained in the same 
unbiased sequence.  Thus, Nbiased has 2% fewer events than Ntrue in the case of a 2% 
downgrade. 
The other set of experiments concerns biased upgrading of crimes.  The 
procedure here is conceptually similar but involves adding events to Ntrue.  These 
events are upgraded from some other set of crimes (e.g., simple assault upgraded to 
aggravated assault).  In the present case, the upgraded crimes are drawn from a 
self-exciting point process with the same parameters as the first.  The addition of 
upgraded crimes in this case ensures that Nbiased > Ntrue.  Reestimating the model 
using Nbiased in this case provides insight into the impact of the upgrading bias on 
the characterization of risk and, ultimately, how it might drive changes in policing.  
I examine repeated upgrading of events sufficient to increase the size of Ntrue by 
2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%.  That is, Nbiased has 2% more events than Ntrue in the 
case of a 2% upgrade. 
The results from simulation are consistent with expectations based on 
intuition.  Fig. 1 shows the impact of downgrading crimes on the estimation of 
parameters for the ETAS predictive policing model.  Simulations are for a self-
exciting point process with background rate μ = 0.5, self-excitation productivity θ 
= 0.6, and timescale of self-excitation ߱ = 5.  These parameter choices have no 
special significance other than to provide a ground truth.  Five independent 
simulations with no downgrading were generated and then fit using MLE.  The 
mean and range of estimates for these five simulations set baseline expectations for 
how well MLE can learn model parameters given a set of unbiased data.  Here, 
each baseline simulation contained approximately 600 events.  The baseline results 
show that the mean estimates for both the background crime rate μ and timescale 
of self-excitation ߱ are very close to the true values.  The estimate for the self-
excitation productivity θ is slightly below the true value.  In each case, however, 
there is considerable variation in parameter estimates from one unbiased run to the 
next.  Fig. 1 shows the one standard deviation (1SD) range of estimates for each 
parameter with the range for the baseline simulation mapped out in gray. 
Simulations to assess the impact of downgrading events were conducted as 
follows.  A baseline simulation with MLE parameter estimates closest to the true 
value was chosen as the test case.  This simulation was used in all subsequent 
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experiments.  This unbiased data set contained 620 events in total.  In the first 
experiment, 2% of the total events were randomly and uniformly removed from the 
dataset, representing downgrading of a crime from a focal type for prediction to 
some non-focal type.  The model was then estimated via MLE using this biased 
dataset.  The procedure was repeated five times, removing 2% randomly and 
uniformly each time.  The five runs provided a mean and range in parameter 
estimates from biased datasets.  The same procedure was then used removing 5%, 
10%, 15%, and 20% of the total 620 events. 
The impact of downgrading events on the background rate μ is quite 
straightforward.  The mean parameter estimate for μ declines linearly with the 
fraction of events downgraded.  The 1SD range in estimates also increases with the 
fraction downgraded.  The mean parameter estimate for self-excitation productivity 
θ increases slightly at low levels of downgrading and then declines, while the 
range increases in a regular fashion.  The timescale of self-excitation ߱ behaves 
somewhat irregularly, first increasing and then decreasing with high variance in 
parameter estimates at all levels of downgrading. 
These results make technical sense.  The background rate μ reflects non-
clustered (Poisson) temporal patterns in the data, and therefore uniform 
downgrading of events should simply depress the background rate in a linear 
fashion.  By contrast, the self-excitation productivity rate θ reflects clustering of 
temporal patterns in the data.  Random, uniform downgrading of events does not 
discriminate between events that are and are not part of a cluster.  At low levels of 
downgrading (2–5%), background events are removed, making remaining events 
appear more clustered.  At high levels of downgrading (>5%), the bias impacts 
both clustered and non-clustered events, which drives an overall decline in the 
mean parameter estimate.  The irregular impact of downgrading on estimates of the 
timescale of self-excitation ߱ also reflects enhanced clustering at low bias levels.  
The clusters that survive at low levels of downgrading are more isolated from one 
another, leading to the appearance that self-excitation is contained more tightly “in 
cluster.”  However, the effect is not particularly large in these simulations.  If we 
take 1/߱ as the mean time in days to a repeat victimization, then the unbiased mean 
to a repeat is 0.2 days.  When 2% of events is downgraded, the biased mean 
declines to 0.19 days, a 5% reduction in the mean time to a repeat crime. 
Importantly, most of the impact of downgrading crimes does not exceed the 
expected variation inherent in the estimation of the models from the data.  The 
gray region in each panel of Fig. 1 shows the 1SD range of parameter estimates for 
five independent runs of the unbiased model.  The mean estimates do not fall 
outside of this range for downgrading biases of <20%.  The one exception is the 
estimate of ߱ with 2% of events downgraded.  The punchline is that these data 
biases would be difficult to distinguish from natural variation in the occurrence of 
events unless such biases impact a substantial fraction of the dataset, perhaps 20% 
or more. 
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Figure 1.  The mean and 1SD range for estimated background rate of crime μ, self-
excitation productivity θ, and the time scale of self-excitation ߱ against the fraction of 
crimes downgraded.  The true parameter value used in simulation is marked by a dashed 
line.  Five independent runs of the point process with no downgrading are shown at the left, 
with the range blocked out in gray to guide the eye. 
 
Overall, the downgrading of events leads to a downgrading of the formal 
estimation of risk.  The estimated background risk of crime is lower with more 
events downgraded.  The estimated risk of crime from self-excitation increases 
slightly at low levels of downgrading but, ultimately, also declines.  At all but the 
most intense levels of downgrading, the amount of change in estimated risk 
induced by bias that downgrades crimes is indistinguishable from the normal 
variation risk tied to crime events. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The mean and 1SD range for estimated background rate of crime μ, self-
excitation productivity θ, and the time scale of self-excitation ߱ against the fraction of 
crimes upgraded.  The true parameter value used in simulation is marked by a dashed line.  
Five independent runs of the point process with no upgrading are shown at the left, with the 
range blocked out in gray to guide the eye. 
 
The impact of upgrading events matches expectations only in part (Fig. 2).  
The simulation and estimation procedures for the upgrading experiments are 
identical in most respects to those used above.  The only difference is that events 
are added to the baseline simulation sufficient to increase the total number of 
events by a certain percentage.  Events are added randomly and uniformly across 
time sufficient to increase the baseline number of events by 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 
and 20%. 
The baseline means and 1SD ranges for model parameters shown in Fig. 2 are 
identical to those shown in Fig. 1.  Upgrading events increases the estimated mean 
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background crime rate μ, perhaps non-linearly.  Intuition suggested that this would 
be the case and would reflect an upgrading of risk.  Unexpectedly, upgrading 
events drives a decline in the estimated mean of self-excitation productivity, and 
this decline is more pronounced than was the case for biased downgrading of 
events.  Intuition suggested the opposite would hold.  The impact of upgrading on 
the timescale of self-excitation is again somewhat irregular but suggests a general 
increase—shortening of the mean time between events—with more events 
upgraded. 
Upon reflection, these outcomes also make technical sense.  Because events 
are added randomly and uniformly, there is no necessary additional clustering 
introduced, and a steady increase in the estimated stationary background rate μ is 
the result.  Moreover, these events are added with no “preference” as to whether 
they join an existing cluster or fill in a space between clusters.  The result is that 
clusters become less distinctive with more upgrading, and the apparent role of self-
excitation declines through the falling productivity parameter θ.  For those clusters 
that absorb upgraded events and survive to be detected, the timescale parameter ߱ 
increases, reflecting an apparent shortening of the time to repeat. 
As with the case of downgrading bias, most of the effects of upgrading fall 
within the range of variation in parameter estimation for unbiased data sets.  
However, these effects are seen at a much lower level of bias.  Generally, if fewer 
than 5% of events in a dataset are upgraded, then the impact on the estimation of 
risk is likely indistinguishable from the natural variation.  If above 5% are 
upgraded, then there is greater cause for concern. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The logical arguments made above focus on how implicit bias operating 
during encounters between police, victims, and suspects may translate into data 
biases.  Implicit bias in this context is expected to downgrade crimes to minimize 
victimization or upgrade crimes to maximize liability.  In turn, simulations show 
that biased downgrading and upgrading of crimes does impact estimation of the 
ETAS predictive policing model.  As expected, biased downgrading of crimes 
leads to biased downgrading of risk.  This is particularly apparent in the 
background risk of crime.  Biased upgrading of crimes leads to biased upgrading of 
risk.  This is seen mostly in the background risk of crime.  Biased upgrading of 
crimes also may lead to a de-emphasis of self-excitation, but this is dependent on 
the particular temporal pattern of upgrading deployed here (see below). 
What is missing from the presentation above is a discussion of how the 
amount of downgrading/upgrading is expected to impact the occurrence of 
predictions.  Lum and Isaac17 take a dynamic approach and assume that prediction 
areas produce arrests at a higher rate than non-prediction areas.  This leads to more 
predictions in those areas and yet more arrests, amplifying the bias.  In the present 
                                                                                                                                      
17  Lum & Isaac, supra note 3. 
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case, I am more interested in how data biases might displace or emplace a 
prediction in a given location.  The answer, of course, depends on context, since 
the occurrence of a prediction in any one location is tied to how that location ranks 
with respect to all other locations that might be flagged. 
A location that always scores very high risk, and therefore is always flagged 
as a prediction area, may actually appear unaffected by upgrading bias.  This is 
because upgrading cannot turn on a prediction that is already there.  This same 
location might also be resistant to downgrading bias except if such biases impact a 
great number of events.  For example, consider a top-ranked prediction location in 
a region that has twenty total prediction locations.  For that location to drop out 
and be replaced by another, it would need to experience a downgrading bias 
sufficient to reduce risk to at least rank twenty-one.  Variance in model estimation 
makes this a little more complicated.  A prediction location that appears 
consistently in spite of high variance in crime might be even more resistant to data 
downgrading bias, as such biases would be masked by the natural variation in 
crime. 
Conversely, a prediction location that appears only infrequently might be 
more susceptible to data biases.  Take, for example, two locations on either side of 
an arbitrary boundary for inclusion in a set of twenty predictions.  One location 
often occupies position twenty in the set and is included as a prediction; the other 
sits at rank twenty-one most of the time and is excluded.  In the first case, a small 
amount of downgrading bias may cause that location to drop in risk estimation and 
therefore fall out of the prediction set.  In the second, a small amount of upgrading 
bias may cause that location to jump up in risk estimation and be included in the 
prediction set.  These outcomes are of course dependent upon the role that 
temporal and spatial variance in crime plays in the relative ranking of risk.  High 
variance, again, may mask the effects of both downgrading and upgrading bias for 
these low-ranked locations.  In other words, these predictions will be dropping in 
and out because of natural variation in crime anyways.  The point is that data 
biases do not necessarily impact all predictions equally.  Further work is certainly 
needed on this issue. 
It was argued above that the operation of implicit bias depends, to a large 
extent, on how police become aware of a crime.  To assess how important these 
distinctions are, we ultimately need to know the fraction of crimes that are (1) 
reported to the police by the public; (2) detected via observed environmental cues; 
(3) known because the offender is caught in the act; and (4) discovered only via 
some predicate event.  The prevalence of these pathways is likely to vary 
somewhat by crime type, with most property crimes being dominated by public 
reporting to police and “victimless crimes,” such as drug use, being driven by 
police discovery.  Precise numbers are hard to come by, but the fact that most 
crime types are so heavily underreported shows that police are not particularly 
effective at discovering crime.  Rather, they are dependent upon the public for 
reporting.  The hypothesis then is that the first pathway that brings police into 
contact with victims dominates the other pathways.  Thus, implicit bias that 
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downgrades crimes to minimize victimization is much more common than implicit 
bias that upgrades crimes to maximize liability. 
Beyond issues of general prevalence of opportunities for bias to operate, we 
need to know something about its magnitude.  It is perhaps convenient to argue the 
extremes: that implicit bias has the maximum impact on each and every crime tied 
to a victim or suspect of a targeted group (the anti-police stance) or that it does not 
exist and therefore does not impact any events (the pro-police stance).  It seems far 
more reasonable to assume that implicit bias does not operate at the extremes but, 
rather, is heterogeneous in both space and time.  Of course, this makes the task of 
trying to assess the impact of implicit bias on the police data much more 
challenging.  The conclusion is that we need to work hard to figure out how to 
detect and correct for biases in police data rather than rejecting such data out of 
hand or accepting it without further thought. 
The goal of the present work was to start the process of mapping the 
fundamental ways in which implicit biases can impact police data and percolate 
through to algorithmic predictive policing programs.  While a reasonable first step, 
numerous limitations must be highlighted.  First, implicit bias was framed 
simplistically without any reference to detailed experimental work in psychology 
and sociology.  Future work should seek to ground the simplifying assumptions in 
this rich source of evidence. 
Second, blanket concepts of crime type downgrading and upgrading were 
taken as the only avenue by which implicit bias might operate to impact crime 
event data.  It is possible that the spatial and temporal features of crime events 
might also be impacted in some way, for example, through biased variation in the 
accuracy with which such information is collected.  It is also possible that implicit 
biases tied to more complex aspects of crime investigation, including attribution of 
motive, might influence primitive data about the events.  More work is needed to 
try to understand whether such complex processes are at play. 
Third, there are significant limitations to the simulation experiments presented 
here.  These focused on random, uniform downgrading/upgrading of crimes.  That 
is, any one crime has an equal probability of being impacted by bias.  The 
experimental approach is not particularly realistic.  The results might be quite 
different if downgrading/upgrading were to preferentially act on clusters of events.  
For example, one crime is more likely to be downgraded/upgraded if it follows 
closely another crime associated with the same targeted social group.  This is akin 
to the Lum and Isaac18 mechanism where previous arrests are more likely to lead to 
future arrests.  However, the advantage of starting with the simpler mechanism is 
that it provides a basis for mapping out fundamental mechanisms.  Indeed, the 
results here should be easily translated into initial mathematical propositions about 
how bias impacts data.  This is a first step to building algorithms that are able to 
better handle—or perhaps even correct for—such biases.  Future work can look to 
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more complex bias mechanisms.  But without the simple first steps, there is little 
hope of seeking to manage the more complex bias mechanisms. 
